I understand why people want to defend Belichick’s horrendous decision to go for it on the fourth down at the end of the Patriots’ game tonight against the Indianapolis Colts. Like here and here. Belichick has always seemed a bit hard to understand, a bit crazy, a bit out of control. But he only ever seemed that way. Belichick is a strategist and a tactician and he knows what he’s doing. And that’s why, retrospectively, this play makes less and less sense to me the more I think about it.
Liking the play was justifiable in some misguided, idealistic way. I’ll admit that I was kind of excited when I saw that they were going for it. Because it was unexpected and roguish and kind of fun. But once you got past that, it was just downright stupid. There’s supposed to be a method to Belichick’s madness, but this was just ridiculous.
The articles I linked cite the fact that plays like that (4th and 2 conversion) have a 60% rate of success. They use that statistic as the basis for justifying Belichick’s decision to go for it, but statistics are never enough to justify something as insane as this. The Patriots were winning, let’s not forget. I’m not going to lament the fact that Belichick wasted those last two timeouts because hindsight is 20/20, but he should have taken that into account when he made his decision.
Sure there was a 60% success rate for similar plays, but the remaining 40% had no safety net. Let’s look at the numbers other than those percentages. There were two minutes left and the Pats were at their own 29 yard line. Brian Burke from the New York Times’ NFL Blog (the first link I gave), had this to offer:
With 2:00 left and the Colts with only one timeout, a successful conversion wins the game for all practical purposes. A 4th-and-2 conversion would be successful 60% of the time. Historically, in a situation with 2:00 left and needing a TD to either win or tie, teams get the TD 53% of the time from that field position. The total win probability for the 4th-down conversion attempt would therefore be:
(0.60 * 1) + (0.40 * (1-0.53)) = 0.79 WP (WP stands for win probability)
A punt from the 28 typically nets 38 yards, starting the Colts at their 34. Teams historically get the TD 30% of the time in that situation. So the punt gives the Pats about a 0.70 WP.
But look at the end of that first paragraph where I italicized. He’s talking about this situation historically and statistically but in the context of needing the TD to win or tie. The Pats didn’t need it for either of these things. The situations that Burke is talking about are ones in which such a play is essentially the only option. This was not one of those situations, not by a long shot. It’s an entirely different situation, a different context, a different mentality; because of all these factors, it can’t really be said that the play was statistically the best option. These elements change the value of the figures.
Anyway, the Patriots had no timeouts left and, thus, no challenges (one of which would have been particularly useful on the play in question and just might have resulted in Kevin Faulk getting that first down). It wasn’t just a matter of the success or failure in one play. It was 60% you get the first down and maintain possession, 40% you turn it over and guarantee that you will lose. Do we still want to go with the statistics? What about punting the damn ball and having a 100% chance of being able to play defense, do your best to hold on to the lead for two minutes, have a hell of a lot more of the field to play defense on? Did I mention holding onto the lead? Did I mention that this play was completely unnecessary and pointless and a horrible idea in every possible way? Did I mention that the statistics offered in favor of the play are utterly irrelevant to the situation? I did? Good.
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